The Republic: Books I and II
The Republic: Books I and II
What is justice?
Note to Readers: This is a long article about the first two books of Plato’s Republic. It began as a notebook entry. Then I added more details and background information to turn it into an article. However, it is quite long and a bit rambling. It is by no means a summary or an authoritative analysis of The Republic, but more of a tool for my own learning that others might be interested in. Thanks for reading.
Introduction
Plato wrote The Republic around 375 BC, about a quarter century after the death of Socrates. At this time, Plato was in his early fifties and he would live another quarter century. The Republic is a Socratic dialog, like The Apology and Crito which I wrote about recently. The Republic is one of Plato’s most famous works and has been very influential in philosophy and politics, both in ancient and modern times.
I am working through the fifteen readings of A General Introduction to the Great Books and to a Liberal Education. The second reading covers Books I and II of The Republic. There are ten books in The Republic, so this selection is only an introduction to the entire work. Although there are limitations to reading a subset of a larger work, the guidebook suggests that several questions can be answered from a partial reading.
This lengthy article contains some of my notes and quotations from the reading. It is not a comprehensive summary and is certainly not an authoritative analysis. It was written more for my benefit than for public consumption. However, perhaps some of the details here will inspire people to read The Republic for themselves. Like all good literature, The Republic is difficult to summarize. In particular, it is hard to describe the Socratic style of argument and discussion which is quite fascinating.
The overriding question concerns justice, something that nearly everyone wants to have for themselves, if not for others and society as a whole. But while we are quick to demand justice, it is less common to take a step back and ponder exactly how we should define justice. The dictionary definitions of justice tend to be circular and fail to provide a coherent philosophy around the subject.
As The Republic begins, Socrates is returning from the port of Piraeus to Athens along with Glaucon, a younger companion who is also one of Plato’s brothers. As the two men walk home, they are intercepted by Polemarchus who strenuously urges Socrates and Glaucon to delay their trip home in order to see a festival and engage in debate at the home of his father, Cephalus, an old man who has not seen Socrates in some time.
Cephalus
As Book I gets underway, we witness a reunion between Socrates and Cephalus who admonishes Socrates for failing to visit him on a regular basis. Due to his advanced age, Cephalus is unable to travel the five miles to Athens to see Socrates. As age takes its physical toll on Cephalus, he derives more pleasure in philosophical discussions. Socrates replies that he likes nothing better than discussions with old men since it provides a preview into the path that he might take in the future.
Cephalus views his situation with a sense of equanimity, unlike most old men:
“I will tell you, Socrates, he said, what my own feeling is. Men of my age flock together; we are birds of a feather, as the old proverb says; and at our meetings the tale of my acquaintance commonly is --I cannot eat, I cannot drink; the pleasures of youth and love are fled away: there was a good time once, but now that is gone, and life is no longer life. Some complain of the slights which are put upon them by relations, and they will tell you sadly of how many evils their old age is the cause. But to me, Socrates, these complainers seem to blame that which is not really in fault. For if old age were the cause, I too being old, and every other old man, would have felt as they do. But this is not my own experience, nor that of others whom I have known.”
Ultimately, one’s underlying temperament determines whether old age is a time of complaining and strife or happiness. Some good advice to start the dialog:
“For certainly old age has a great sense of calm and freedom; when the passions relax their hold, then, as Sophocles says, we are freed from the grasp not of one mad master only, but of many. The truth is, Socrates, that these regrets, and also the complaints about relations, are to be attributed to the same cause, which is not old age, but men's characters and tempers; for he who is of a calm and happy nature will hardly feel the pressure of age, but to him who is of an opposite disposition youth and age are equally a burden.”
Socrates wonders whether Cephalus has a good attitude toward old age because he is a wealthy man and, without much tact, directly asks Cephalus whether his wealth is mostly inherited or earned (acquired). Cephalus can trace some of his wealth to his grandfather, but his own father squandered a portion of it. Cephalus, near the end of his life, has increased his wealth beyond what he received. Socrates replies that Cephalus seems indifferent to wealth which is a characteristic of those who have inherited most of their wealth.
“The makers of fortunes have a second love of money as a creation of their own, resembling the affection of authors for their own poems, or of parents for their children, besides that natural love of it for the sake of use and profit which is common to them and all men. And hence they are very bad company, for they can talk about nothing but the praises of wealth.”
Cephalus considers the greatest benefit of wealth to be the lack of a need to defraud anyone. This is a great relief since many old men begin to worry about punishments in the next world meted out due to bad deeds in this world:
“And the great blessing of riches, I do not say to every man, but to a good man, is, that he has had no occasion to deceive or to defraud others, either intentionally or unintentionally; and when he departs to the world below he is not in any apprehension about offerings due to the gods or debts which he owes to men. Now to this peace of mind the possession of wealth greatly contributes; and therefore I say, that, setting one thing against another, of the many advantages which wealth has to give, to a man of sense this is in my opinion the greatest.”
This discussion raises the question of the definition of justice. Socrates asks whether the definition of justice is simply to speak the truth and pay your debts, and nothing more, without exception. He quickly adds that in some cases, it is unjust to pay back debts. For example, if a man deposits arms with you for safekeeping, it would be unjust to return those arms if the man comes back to you when he is mentally incompetent. Cephalus concedes that the definition of justice must be more than speaking the truth and paying debts. However, he has no desire to pursue the question of the definition of justice, quickly departing to offer sacrifices at the festival.
Polemarchus
Taking over for his father, Polemarchus, after some prompting by Socrates, defines justice as doing good to your friends and harm to your enemies. This is a more sophisticated definition because “doing good to your friends” can include more nuance than allowed for in the definition that Cephalus put forward. If a friend has deposited arms with you and demands their return while out of his mind, it would fall under the definition of “doing good to your friends” if you refuse to repay that debt.
But what do we owe to enemies? Are enemies to receive what we owe to them? Polemarchus replies that enemies “are to receive what we owe them, and an enemy, as I take it, owes to an enemy that which is due or proper to him — that is to say, evil.”
Through a meandering dialogue, Socrates eventually arrives at the point that things are not always as they seem. There are false friends and false enemies. It is common to err about who is good and who is evil, and sometimes one can arrive at conclusions that are entirely at odds with reality. In such situations, a man risks doing good to the evil and evil to the good, which of course is immoral. Socrates asks Polemarchus whether his definition should be refined as follows:
“… Instead of saying simply as we did at first, that it is just to do good to our friends and harm to our enemies, we should further say: It is just to do good to our friends when they are good and harm to our enemies when they are evil?”
After Polemarchus agrees to this definition, Socrates takes the dialogue in a different direction, questioning whether it is proper to do evil, or injure, anyone at all. Polemarchus says that one “undoubtedly” ought to injure those who are both wicked and his enemies. Socrates points out the problem with this idea. Inflicting an injury on anything has the effect of deteriorating the object of the assault. Injuring a human being results in deterioration of the individual, inherently harming virtue and justice. Socrates asserts that injuring anyone, friend or enemy, cannot be the act of a just man.
“Then if a man says that justice consists in the repayment of debts, and that good is the debt which a man owes to his friends, and evil the debt which he owes to his enemies, --to say this is not wise; for it is not true, if, as has been clearly shown, the injuring of another can be in no case just.”
I view this statement as a remarkable argument for what we now refer to as human rights at a time when such sentiments were anything but widely accepted. It was quite common for even the Greek gods to seek vengeance on each other, not to mention on human beings, so what Socrates is proposing was probably seen as revolutionary. Polemarchus, no doubt reeling from the discussion, feels compelled to agree with Socrates and fades into the background, thoroughly defeated.
Thrasymachus
In a fit of absolute rage, Thrasymachus jumps into the discussion after apparently trying unsuccessfully to cut in on Polemarchus several times. Rude and combative, Thrasymachus accuses Socrates of essentially playing games by having others define justice and proceed to poke holes in their definitions. Why doesn’t Socrates himself offer a definition rather than just pose questions?
“He roared out to the whole company: What folly. Socrates, has taken possession of you all? And why, sillybillies, do you knock under to one another? I say that if you want really to know what justice is, you should not only ask but answer, and you should not seek honour to yourself from the refutation of an opponent, but have your own answer; for there is many a one who can ask and cannot answer. And now I will not have you say that justice is duty or advantage or profit or gain or interest, for this sort of nonsense will not do for me; I must have clearness and accuracy.”
Although “panic-stricken” by the fury of Thrasymachus, Socrates manages to pull himself together while still “trembling”.
“Thrasymachus, I said, with a quiver, don't be hard upon us. Polemarchus and I may have been guilty of a little mistake in the argument, but I can assure you that the error was not intentional. If we were seeking for a piece of gold, you would not imagine that we were 'knocking under to one another,' and so losing our chance of finding it. And why, when we are seeking for justice, a thing more precious than many pieces of gold, do you say that we are weakly yielding to one another and not doing our utmost to get at the truth? Nay, my good friend, we are most willing and anxious to do so, but the fact is that we cannot. And if so, you people who know all things should pity us and not be angry with us.”
After much cajoling and prompting, Thrasymachus agrees to put forward his own definition of justice, even though he is still irritated that Socrates is unwilling to declare and defend his own definition.
Thrasymachus’s definition of justice: “I proclaim that justice is nothing else than the interest of the stronger.”
When asked to clarify, Thrasymachus puts his definition in the context of government:
“… The different forms of government make laws democratical, aristocratical, tyrannical, with a view to their several interests; and these laws, which are made by them for their own interests, are the justice which they deliver to their subjects, and him who transgresses them they punish as a breaker of the law, and unjust. And that is what I mean when I say that in all states there is the same principle of justice, which is the interest of the government; and as the government must be supposed to have power, the only reasonable conclusion is, that everywhere there is one principle of justice, which is the interest of the stronger.”
The obvious problem is that rulers are not infallible, a point that Socrates quickly points out. Additionally, through a lengthy discussion, Socrates arrives at the claim that a true ruler does not act based on what is in his interest but what is in the interests of his subjects, just as a true physician acts in the interest of the patient rather than in the interest of himself. Like other professions, ruling is a form of practical art, and the goal of the artist is to perfect his art.
“Then, I said, Thrasymachus, there is no one in any rule who, in so far as he is a ruler, considers or enjoins what is for his own interest, but always what is for the interest of his subject or suitable to his art; to that he looks, and that alone he considers in everything which he says and does.”
Needless to say, Thrasymachus takes a far more cynical view of the world, declaring that “the just is always a loser in comparison with the unjust.”
“First of all, in private contracts: wherever the unjust is the partner of the just you will find that, when the partnership is dissolved, the unjust man has always more and the just less. Secondly, in their dealings with the State: when there is an income tax, the just man will pay more and the unjust less on the same amount of income; and when there is anything to be received the one gains nothing and the other much. Observe also what happens when they take an office; there is the just man neglecting his affairs and perhaps suffering other losses, and getting nothing out of the public, because he is just; moreover he is hated by his friends and acquaintance for refusing to serve them in unlawful ways.”
In Thrasymachus’s view, the highest form of injustice is tyranny which “takes away the property of others, not little by little but wholesale” and makes slaves of citizens. And for this, the tyrant is not scorned but viewed positively because, according to Thrasymachus, this is the ultimate goal. Men only fear injustice because they fear being the victim of it, not because they are morally opposed to it.
“For mankind censure injustice, fearing that they may be the victims of it and not because they shrink from committing it. And thus, as I have shown, Socrates, injustice, when on a sufficient scale, has more strength and freedom and mastery than justice; and, as I said at first, justice is the interest of the stronger, whereas injustice is a man's own profit and interest.”
Thrasymachus attempts to quickly depart but the others in the conversation insist that he remains to discuss the matter further, so he reluctantly agrees. Socrates fundamentally disagrees with the idea that injustice is more profitable than justice:
“For my own part I openly declare that I am not convinced, and that I do not believe injustice to be more gainful than justice, even if uncontrolled and allowed to have free play. For, granting that there may be an unjust man who is able to commit injustice either by fraud or force, still this does not convince me of the superior advantage of injustice, and there may be others who are in the same predicament with myself. Perhaps we may be wrong; if so, you in your wisdom should convince us that we are mistaken in preferring justice to injustice.”
Socrates later makes an insightful comment about the reluctance of good men to serve as rulers, precisely because the art of ruling requires one to put the interest of subjects above the interest of the rulers. Therefore, by serving as a ruler, a man disadvantages himself yet cannot openly seek compensation in exchange.
“And for this reason, I said, money and honour have no attraction for them; good men do not wish to be openly demanding payment for governing and so to get the name of hirelings, nor by secretly helping themselves out of the public revenues to get the name of thieves. And not being ambitious they do not care about honour. Wherefore necessity must be laid upon them, and they must be induced to serve from the fear of punishment. And this, as I imagine, is the reason why the forwardness to take office, instead of waiting to be compelled, has been deemed dishonourable. Now the worst part of the punishment is that he who refuses to rule is liable to be ruled by one who is worse than himself. And the fear of this, as I conceive, induces the good to take office, not because they would, but because they cannot help --not under the idea that they are going to have any benefit or enjoyment themselves, but as a necessity, and because they are not able to commit the task of ruling to any one who is better than themselves, or indeed as good.” [Emphasis added]
The ultimate proof that the art of ruling is to look after the interests of the subject is that being pushed into service is more a matter of avoiding a penalty than seeking honors or money. If you are capable and honorable but refuse to serve, someone who is unqualified or unethical could take your place and impose penalties on you.
Predictably, Thrasymachus is not impressed and remains cynical. He still asserts that injustice is more profitable than justice and he calls the just “amusing creatures” who are ultimately incapable — in other words, perennial losers. The unjust man will struggle to grasp all that he can, from both the just and from others who are unjust. The just man will not attempt to take advantage of other just men and will be incapable of taking advantage of unjust men.
Toward the end of Book I, Socrates points out that injustice creates divisions, hatred, and fighting while justice imparts harmony and friendship. Furthermore, injustice in an individual causes problems because the individual is no longer “at unity with himself” which ultimately leads to misery. If the end, Socrates defines justice to be the object of the soul and injustice the defect of the soul, proving that the just must be happy while the unjust miserable.
As the book closes, Socrates has prevailed over his interlocutors but still has not discovered the true nature and definition of justice, having turned his attention to whether justice is a virtue or folly, as well as toward the question of the comparative advantages of justice and injustice. And so Book I closes as follows:
“As an epicure snatches a taste of every dish which is successively brought to table, he not having allowed himself time to enjoy the one before, so have I gone from one subject to another without having discovered what I sought at first, the nature of justice. I left that enquiry and turned away to consider whether justice is virtue and wisdom or evil and folly; and when there arose a further question about the comparative advantages of justice and injustice, I could not refrain from passing on to that. And the result of the whole discussion has been that I know nothing at all. For I know not what justice is, and therefore I am not likely to know whether it is or is not a virtue, nor can I say whether the just man is happy or unhappy.” [Emphasis added]
So Book I ends without a definition of justice, with Socrates claiming that he knows “nothing at all” but Glaucon is not willing to drop the conversation as Book II begins.
Plato’s Brothers
Glaucon and Adeimantus carry forward the discussion after Socrates finished up his dialogue with Thrasymachus at the end of Book I. As we recall, Glaucon was the man who accompanied Socrates as he started walking back to Athens. He was Plato’s older brother and somewhat more established in life. Adeimantus is Glaucon’s younger brother and plays a lesser role in the dialogue. It’s interesting to note that Glaucon and Adeimantus were seventeen and fourteen years older than Plato, respectively.
Glaucon is not convinced that Socrates has proven that it is always better to be just than to be unjust. Unlike Thrasymachus, Glaucon seems to not have a cynical view of the world and would prefer to believe in the superiority of justice to injustice, but he has never heard a satisfactory rebuttal to the view that the unjust seem to often come out on top in life while the just as essentially played for fools. He proposes playing devil’s advocate making the case for the superiority of injustice so Socrates can pick apart the argument and advocate for the cause of justice:
“I have never yet heard the superiority of justice to injustice maintained by any one in a satisfactory way. I want to hear justice praised in respect of itself; then I shall be satisfied, and you are the person from whom I think that I am most likely to hear this; and therefore I will praise the unjust life to the utmost of my power, and my manner of speaking will indicate the manner in which I desire to hear you too praising justice and censuring injustice. Will you say whether you approve of my proposal?”
Socrates approves of the proposal and Glaucon begins to make his case. He asserts that men widely understand the advantages that accrue to the unjust but, fearing that they may themselves become victims of injustice, support laws against injustice. Such laws are the lesser of two evils. In exchange for foregoing the benefits of committing injustice against others, one must accept that he may also not practice injustice.
As a result, those who practice justice are doing so involuntarily. If they thought that they could get away with injustice without suffering punishment, they would surely do so. To illustrate this point, Glaucon brings up the myth of the Ring of Gyges. This magic ring bestows upon its owner the power to become visible or invisible at will. This poses a fascinating case study in morality. One who can control his visibility has the ability to commit all sorts of injustice and remain totally undetected.
“No man would keep his hands off what was not his own when he could safely take what he liked out of the market, or go into houses and lie with any one at his pleasure, or kill or release from prison whom he would, and in all respects be like a God among men. Then the actions of the just would be as the actions of the unjust; they would both come at last to the same point. And this we may truly affirm to be a great proof that a man is just, not willingly or because he thinks that justice is any good to him individually, but of necessity, for wherever any one thinks that he can safely be unjust, there he is unjust. For all men believe in their hearts that injustice is far more profitable to the individual than justice, and he who argues as I have been supposing, will say that they are right. If you could imagine any one obtaining this power of becoming invisible, and never doing any wrong or touching what was another's, he would be thought by the lookers-on to be a most wretched idiot, although they would praise him to one another's faces, and keep up appearances with one another from a fear that they too might suffer injustice.” [Emphasis added]
Glaucon goes on to say that, absent such a magical ring, it follows that the ideal position is to be unjust while everyone thinks you are just. While it may be more difficult to accomplish this illusion without a magic ring bestowing invisibility, surely there are plenty of two-faced people in the world who get away with presenting an image of justice while acting corruptly. If you can get away with this, you will live the best possible life. In contrast, a just man who is thought to be unjust will have the worst outcome. He will not only fail to profit from injustice but will be considered unjust be his peers and be subject to their hatred and scorn.
The conversation goes on to include Adeimantus who argues on similar grounds as his brother in favor of the greatest returns in life accruing to the unjust who are able to conceal their injustice, perhaps even from the gods, thereby reaping the fruits of injustice and escaping the consequences. I found this entire dialogue fascinating because it reveals a line of moral thought outside the omniscient personal God of the Bible. The Greek gods, while usually honoring justice, do not appear to have necessarily been all-knowing in the same sense as the Judeo-Christian God.
Adeimantus and Glaucon do not believe in these arguments but are perplexed and possibly disheartened by the lack of an intellectually consistent response favoring justice for its own sake. Adeimantus asks Socrates to praise justice “in terms of the essential good or evil which justice and injustice work in the possessors of them.”
In other words, why is justice good in-and-of-itself, whether seen or unseen by other men or even by the gods.
Socrates was impressed by the arguments made by Glaucon and Adeimantus but felt unable to provide such a definition at an individual level, given that he had already made his best efforts to do so with Thrasymachus and apparently failed to convince his audience. He proposes to instead “zoom out” and consider the question of justice at the level of the state rather than the individual. By considering what justice entails for a state, perhaps a definition for justice for individuals will follow.
“Glaucon and the rest entreated me by all means not to let the question drop, but to proceed in the investigation. They wanted to arrive at the truth, first, about the nature of justice and injustice, and secondly, about their relative advantages. I told them, what I really thought, that the enquiry would be of a serious nature, and would require very good eyes. Seeing then, I said, that we are no great wits, I think that we had better adopt a method which I may illustrate thus; suppose that a short-sighted person had been asked by some one to read small letters from a distance; and it occurred to some one else that they might be found in another place which was larger and in which the letters were larger --if they were the same and he could read the larger letters first, and then proceed to the lesser --this would have been thought a rare piece of good fortune.”
The State
For the time being, the question of justice is set aside because it is first necessary to construct a state from the ground up. Socrates launches into a step-by-step process of building a simple state that is established to meet the basic needs of mankind. At a minimum, everyone needs food, shelter, and clothing to survive. Since specialization of labor is far more productive than having every man produce all of these necessities for himself, men specialize in one area based on their natural abilities and inclinations and obtain other necessities through non-coercive mutually beneficial trade.
Even a simple state requires a variety of specialists in areas of agriculture, commerce, and various trades. In addition to those who directly produce goods for consumption, others must be employed in trades that produce capital equipment that makes the trades possible. Marketplaces must be established with merchants and shopkeepers. It will be necessary to produce a surplus of certain commodities to be in a position to trade with neighboring states that have other specialties. A currency of some sort will be necessary to make trade more efficient than if everyone barters directly.
Soon enough, the citizens of the simple state will wish to go beyond the bare necessities of life. As Glaucon says, they will desire a “relish to their meal” which in the context of literal food might be salt, olives, or cheese. But luxuries will be in increasing demand as the state becomes wealthier, as Socrates points out:
“For I suspect that many will not be satisfied with the simpler way. They will be for adding sofas, and tables, and other furniture; also dainties, and perfumes, and incense, and courtesans, and cakes, all these not of one sort only, but in every variety; we must go beyond the necessaries of which I was at first speaking, such as houses, and clothes, and shoes: the arts of the painter and the embroiderer will have to be set in motion, and gold and ivory and all sorts of materials must be procured.”
Here we have hedonic adaptation beginning to exert its force in Ancient Greece.
The problem with the demands for a luxurious state is that existing borders may be insufficient to procure the luxuries demanded by the people. As a result, “a slice of our neighbours’ land will be wanted by us for pasture and tillage, and they will want a slice of ours, if, like ourselves, they exceed the limit of necessity …”
As a result, war enters the picture.
A class of citizens will be necessary to both protect the state from attack by others and to conquer territory needed to deliver luxuries that citizens of the state demand. Since war is an “art”, just like other specializations of labor, professional soldiers are likely to be more effective than citizen-soldiers and a standing army is born. The luxurious state now has the task of selecting appropriate “guardians” who are “brave in spirit” and have good moral character so they will be “dangerous to their enemies and gentle to their friends” much like a good guard dog accepts people it knows and acts viciously with strangers.
Good soldiers must be physically powerful and young men are obviously the logical choice, yet these young men must also be of good character to avoid being a danger to citizens of the state. As a result the discussion takes a diversion into the question of how to best educate young people. This leads to an extended discussion of censorship.
Censorship
At first glance, I found Plato’s enthusiasm for censorship, through the words of Socrates, a bit surprising. I was under the impression that Ancient Greece held free expression in great esteem. However, as I read through the dialog for the second time, it appears that Plato, via the words of Socrates is primarily concerned about the education of young people, particularly soldiers.
“Then the first thing will be to establish a censorship of the writers of fiction, and let the censors receive any tale of fiction which is good, and reject the bad; and we will desire mothers and nurses to tell their children the authorised ones only. Let them fashion the mind with such tales, even more fondly than they mould the body with their hands; but most of those which are now in use must be discarded.”
This is obviously a sweeping statement at odds with modern American sensibilities. Socrates advocates for censorship going back to the words of Homer whose works were already centuries old during Plato’s lifetime. In particular, the nature of gods could not be portrayed as capricious or evil. Gods must not be seen as fighting amongst themselves in heaven, either literally or figuratively.
“But the narrative of Hephaestus binding Here his mother, or how on another occasion Zeus sent him flying for taking her part when she was being beaten, and all the battles of the gods in Homer --these tales must not be admitted into our State, whether they are supposed to have an allegorical meaning or not. For a young person cannot judge what is allegorical and what is literal; anything that he receives into his mind at that age is likely to become indelible and unalterable; and therefore it is most important that the tales which the young first hear should be models of virtuous thoughts.”
The familiar concern that young people are ill equipped to see nuance appears in this argument. What Homer might have written for allegorical reasons might be viewed as literal by the young and cannot be admitted to the state since there is a major interest in raising up guardian soldiers of high moral character. God is to be portrayed as good and never evil. God can only be the author of good things, not of all things.
“Let this then be one of our rules and principles concerning the gods, to which our poets and reciters will be expected to conform --that God is not the author of all things, but of good only.”
It was common for Greek gods to come down from heaven and take different forms, but if the gods are “in every way perfect” they would hardly degrade themselves to take other shapes, least of all human forms. Therefore, poets would be prohibited from having the gods take the guise of humans. Socrates not only condemns such sentiments in Homer but also criticizes Aeschylus, the great tragedian who lived during the previous century.
“These are the kind of sentiments about the gods which will arouse our anger; and he who utters them shall be refused a chorus; neither shall we allow teachers to make use of them in the instruction of the young, meaning, as we do, that our guardians, as far as men can be, should be true worshippers of the gods and like them.”
On this authoritarian note, Book II comes to a close.
Conclusion
The first two books of The Republic cover a great deal of ground but ultimately defer resolution of the question of defining justice. Socrates clearly scores points against his opponents and seems to have the superior moral view but he does not succeed in convincing Plato’s brothers regarding the superiority of justice over injustice in terms of outcomes in life. The discussion is quite abstract and meandering at times.
I found the beginning of the discussion of the state toward the end of Book II intriguing. As The Republic continues, the development of the “luxurious” state will continue. Plato’s assumption that war is the inevitable outcome of “luxury” is quite interesting. The ancient world experienced hedonic adaptation as much as we do and the instinct was to secure resources from other states, itself clearly a form of injustice when unprovoked. The premise of war being the outcome of luxury is not examined.
Socrates discusses the distinction between art and profit maximization, assessing that the true artist focuses on the object of his art rather than his own self-interest. In this way, he reaches the conclusion that the object of the art of ruling is to serve the people rather than the ruler. I take some lessons from this view of “art” in terms of modern professions. For example, a fiduciary is supposed to put the interests of his client above his own interests. Investment advisory, viewed in this way, is an “art” or a profession, not merely a way to make money. I’m reminded of how Jack Bogle thought of investment management as a profession. Perhaps he was inspired by Socrates.
Socrates favors robust censorship in his state, something that offends American sensibilities. Banning works of fiction, as he advocates, is a heavy handed way of promoting what the state views as high moral character. In Ancient Greece, it was probably possible to censor material quite easily given the difficulty of copying ancient texts. Obviously, the same is not true today with the internet. Socrates seems more concerned with censoring what young people have access to, but clearly goes beyond simple curation of material. This debate seems quite current in the context of disputes over proper curriculum in public schools in the twenty-first century.
I look forward to reading the rest of The Republic. Although my reading plan only calls for reading Books I and II for now, it hardly seems proper to stop before the story of the state plays out. I am curious to see how Socrates develops the state further and how it all eventually ties back to justice at the individual level. I will write notebook entries as I proceed, although it is possible that some entries will evolve into articles.
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